Teraswitch status is Operational

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Intra-Market Connectivity
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Internet Exchanges and Peering
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Teraswitch MIA1 - Miami, FL

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Teraswitch LON1 - London, United Kingdom

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Teraswitch AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands

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Teraswitch AMS2 - Amsterdam, Netherlands

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Teraswitch AMS3 - Amsterdam, Netherlands

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Last updated 1 minute ago from official status page. Learn more

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Active Incidents

No active incidents

Recently Resolved Incidents

Global - Internet Instability
Started 29 Jul 2026 19:15:40 (20 days ago), resolved 18 Aug 2026 17:37:54 (8 hours ago)
Major Incident
Resolved
Intra-Market Connectivity
Internet Exchanges and Peering

Teraswitch is looking into general Internet Instability.

Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
Critical Incident
Resolved
Intra-Market Connectivity
Internet Exchanges and Peering
MIA1 - Miami, FL
LON1 - London, United Kingdom
AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
More...

(This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

A full RFO will follow.

Teraswitch Outage Survival Guide

A step-by-step guide to help you survive a Teraswitch outage
NaN%

    Teraswitch Components

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    Teraswitch Public Services

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    API
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    Website (teraswitch.com)
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    Portal (console.tsw.io)
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    Teraswitch Global Network Services

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    Intra-Market Connectivity
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    Global - Internet Instability
    Started 29 Jul 2026 19:15:40 (20 days ago), resolved 18 Aug 2026 17:37:54 (8 hours ago)
    Major Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering

    Teraswitch is looking into general Internet Instability.

    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Global External Internet
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    Internet Exchanges and Peering
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    Global - Internet Instability
    Started 29 Jul 2026 19:15:40 (20 days ago), resolved 18 Aug 2026 17:37:54 (8 hours ago)
    Major Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering

    Teraswitch is looking into general Internet Instability.

    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Ultra-Low Latency Connectivity
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    Teraswitch PIT1 - Pittsburgh, PA

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    Teraswitch IAD1 - Ashburn, VA

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    Teraswitch EWR1 - Newark, NJ

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    Teraswitch EWR2 - Newark, NJ

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    Teraswitch MIA1 - Miami, FL

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    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch CHI1 - Chicago, IL

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    Teraswitch DAL1 - Dallas, TX

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    Teraswitch SLC1 - Salt Lake City, UT

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    Teraswitch LAX1 - Los Angeles, CA

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    Teraswitch SEA1 - Seattle, WA

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    Teraswitch VAN1 - Vancouver, Canada

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    Teraswitch LON1 - London, United Kingdom

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    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands

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    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch AMS2 - Amsterdam, Netherlands

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    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch AMS3 - Amsterdam, Netherlands

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    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch DUB1 - Dublin, Ireland

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    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch FRA1 - Frankfurt, Germany

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now

    Teraswitch DUB2 - Dublin, Ireland

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch FRA2 - Frankfurt, Germany

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch SGP1 - Singapore

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch SGP2 - Singapore

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch TYO1 - Tokyo, Japan

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch SEL1 - Seoul, South Korea

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now

    Teraswitch TYO2 - Tokyo, Japan

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

    Teraswitch TYO3 - Tokyo, Japan

    Wed 12
    Thu 13
    Fri 14
    Sat 15
    Sun 16
    Mon 17
    Tue 18
    now
    Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites
    Started 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 (7 days ago), resolved 12 Aug 2026 18:29:25 (6 days ago)
    Critical Incident
    Resolved
    Intra-Market Connectivity
    Internet Exchanges and Peering
    MIA1 - Miami, FL
    LON1 - London, United Kingdom
    AMS1 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
    More...

    (This status is split off from a previous issue that was originally believed to have been related.)

    Customers at LON1, AMS1, AMS2, AMS3, DUB1, DUB2, FRA2, SGP1, SGP2, TYO1, TYO2 and TYO3 experienced loss of reachability to Internet destinations, as well as to internal Teraswitch backbone destinations between affected sites. Other North American sites were not affected.

    MIA1 (Miami, FL) was intentionally removed from the backbone as part of our response. MIA1 remains reachable and in service, but is currently operating without full backbone connectivity, traffic to and from other Teraswitch sites is routed over the public Internet rather than our private backbone. Customers relying on MIA1 for private backbone or inter-site connectivity should expect changed latency and path characteristics until MIA1 is reintegrated.

    Cause: Teraswitch uses a default route (0.0.0.0/0) internally to signal that an edge router is able to forward traffic to the Internet. Each site normally prefers the default originated by its own local edge routers, with route attributes distinguishing a local origination from a remote one.

    A default route originated at MIA1 was propagated with its metric and communities stripped and an AS-path containing only our own ASN. At this time, our understanding is that this route never existed within MIA1's routers as a valid route. A route reflector at our AMS2 site propagated this altered route into our EU and APAC markets. Receiving edge routers interpreted it as locally originated and preferred it over their own valid local default. Those routers then advertised the route to the downstream data center core, which rejected it as invalid. With no acceptable default present, the affected site fabrics stopped forwarding traffic to their own edge routers, resulting in the loss of reachability observed.

    Resolution: Engineers identified the malformed route within 10 minutes of onset and removed MIA1 from the backbone to halt further propagation. Affected sites reconverged on their local default routes and service was restored at 04:16:15 UTC.

    Next steps: The underlying defect, whether in the MIA1 edge routers or in the route reflector, has not yet been identified. We are working to reproduce the condition and have engaged our vendor. In the interim we are implementing policy to enforce minimal required attributes on internally originated default routes so that a malformed advertisement cannot be preferred over a valid local one. MIA1 will remain off the backbone until the defect is understood and mitigations are verified; we will post an update when it is reintegrated.

    A full RFO will follow.

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